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YAMAHA MOTOR CORP. V. CALHOUN: AN
EXAMINATION OF JURISDICTION, CHOICE-OF-LAWS,
AND FEDERAL INTERESTS IN MARITIME LAW
B.J. Haeck
Abstract: In Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
state remedies were still available for non-seamen killed inside of a state's three-mile
territorial sea, despite the existence of a general maritime remedy at federal law. This Note
argues that the Court failed to consider its traditional tests when confronted with this choice
between state and federal maritime law. In so doing, it erred in finding that state law was
applicable. The Court's decision also created a conflict between the traditional standard of
significant federal interest required in order to confer federal admiralty jurisdiction to tort
plaintiffs and the Yamaha Court's rationale that there was not enough of a federal interest to
mandate a system of uniform federal remedies. In response to this problem, this Note argues
that federal courts' maritime tort jurisdiction be narrowed to assure that when a case is heard
at admiralty the requisite federal interests exist
The United States is one of the most active commercial nations in the
world. In 1994, $517 billion worth of goods were transported to and
from the United States via waterborne shipping.' This figure represents
almost half the value of all U.S. exports and imports that year.2 If one
measures the transactions by gross tonnage, the percentage of U.S. goods
that travels by boat leaps to over ninety-eight percent.3 The United States
has been successful in establishing itself as a maritime nation largely
because U.S. admiralty law has followed traditional maritime law
principles accepted around the world.4 Therefore, when a foreign
company chooses to ship its goods to the United States, it knows the
legal standards it will be expected to meet if an accident occurs. This
principle of uniformity has been the motivating factor behind admiralty
law since the States ratified the U.S. Constitution.' In 1996, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court cast doubt on this longstanding concept. In Yamaha
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,6 the Court held that a state's interest in having
its laws enforced may supersede the principle of uniformity of maritime
law.
1. 1995 Statistical Abstract ofthe United States 662.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 1 Steven F. Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 105 (7th ed. rev. 1996).
5. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
6. 116 S. Ct. 619, 628-29 (1996).
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In maritime tort, seamen injured or killed due to an employer's
negligence anywhere on navigable waters may recover damages under
the Jones Act.7 Non-seamen injured on the high seas9 have a negligence
cause of action under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).' °
Before 1970, however, the families of non-seamen killed within a state's
territorial seas could recover only under that state's wrongful death
statute." Because many of the state statutes precluded some of the causes
of action recognizable in admiralty law, including the strict liability
recovery allowed for injuries due to the unseaworthiness of a ship, many
non-seamen were left without recoveries. 2 In the 1970 landmark case,
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,3 the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized this gap and created a general maritime law wrongful death
action for non-seamen killed in state waters.1
4
In Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,5 however, the Court held that,
although Moragne created a federal wrongful death cause of action, state
remedies are still available to supplement a federal recovery for non-
seamen. By doing so, the Court created extensive doubt and conflict
within its own jurisprudence. The Yamaha decision damages the
uniformity of admiralty law that the Court has emphasized in its past
decisions and ignores prior holdings that properly established the
supremacy of federal remedies in admiralty law. As a consequence,
maritime commerce could suffer through the added uncertainty injected
into shipowners' calculations of the allocation of their resources.
Accordingly, the Yamaha opinion should be construed as narrowly as
possible by lower courts who interpret it.
7. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1995).
8. Non-seamen are defined, for the purposes of this Note, as individuals who do not qualify for
coverage under the Jones Act. The Jones Act provides a cause of action to individuals who further
the purpose of a boat or a fleet of boats for injuries caused due to the negligence of the seaman's
employer. § 688. Thus, passengers and recreational boaters, among others, are defined as non-
seamen. Cf Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir. 1986); Braniff v. Jackson
Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960).
9. The "high seas" is defined as the area outside each state's three-mile territorial seas. 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1995).
10. 46 U.S.C. ch. 21 (1995). Because the Jones Act only covers negligence, seamen injured on the
high seas because of a ship's unseaworthiness or product defects may recover through DOHSA. 46
U.S.C. § 688.
11. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,393 (1970).
12. See id. at 395.
13. 398 U.S. 375.
14. Id at 409.
15. 116 S. Ct 619 (1996).
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Part I of this Note discusses the general background regarding the
establishment of federal maritime law and admiralty wrongful death
actions. Part II examines the facts and procedural history of Yamaha
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun. Part III sets forth some of the admiralty choice-
of-law factors that usually are examined to determine whether federal or
state law applies in a maritime tort action. It then asserts that the Yamaha
Court's decision ignores these factors. Part IV argues that the Court
failed to recognize the reasoning behind granting federal maritime
jurisdiction-the uniformity of federal maritime laws-when it allowed
state remedies to supplement federal law recoveries. It also examines
future problems that courts may face as a result of the decision unless
Yamaha is limited to its facts. Finally, part IV proposes that a new factor
be added to the jurisdictional test providing that admiralty jurisdiction is
inappropriate if state substantive law is to be applied.
I. BACKGROUND OF MARITIME TORT JURISDICTION AND
THE CREATION OF THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
A. Brief History of U.S. Admiralty Law
When the Framers wrote the U.S. Constitution, they realized that the
complex nature of federalism would make maritime commerce
transactions difficult. 6 In an effort to encourage maritime commerce, the
government wanted to establish a uniform set of maritime laws. 7
The U.S. Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 established
federal jurisdiction over maritime torts in order to provide a uniform set
of rules for those who wished to conduct maritime commerce. 8 The
jurisdictional test for torts was originally based on a location test only,
one that inquired whether the actions that led to the tort occurred on a
navigable body of water. 9 Thus, if an accident occurred on the oceans or
16. See 1 Friedell, supra note 4, § 105 (1996). The Framers' concern was that the several states'
laws would differ in many respects and confuse foreign shippers. Id.; see also The St. Lawrence, 66
U.S. 522,526-27 (1853).
17. The St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. at 526-27; see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 572-73 (1874).
18. See U.S. Const. art. liT, § 2 (stating that federal judiciary will have power to hear "all Cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"); 1 Stat. 76 (1789).
19. Thomas Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 56-60 (1987); see De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F.
Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776); see also The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. 428, 429 (1825).
Navigability in this context refers to the ebb and flow of tides. Later, jurisdiction was expanded to
include all navigable lakes and rivers, meaning all lakes and rivers able to be used for maritime
commerce. See 5 Stat. 726 (1845).
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on any river affected by the tide, the federal courts had admiralty
jurisdiction. The courts adopted these English traditions because the
people and the courts of the United States were familiar with the British
legal system and, therefore, often adopted wholesale British substantive
and procedural maritime law.2"
U.S. law began to develop its own character, however, early in the
nineteenth century as American judges expanded the bases for admiralty
jurisdiction.2' Although most early courts recognized the limitation of the
"locality rule," courts and Congress gradually expanded maritime
jurisdiction past its earlier limitations.22 In 1845, in The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,' the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress's
extension of admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes. The Court held
that the reach of admiralty jurisdiction was not constitutional in nature,
and, therefore, admiralty jurisdiction could be regulated by Congress.24
Eventually, jurisdiction was extended to all torts occurring on interstate
waters able to carry maritime commerce, regardless of whether these
waters were affected by the tides.'
B. Maritime Wrongful Death Actions
While maritime jurisdiction was being expanded, so too was the law
regarding what damages could be recovered through a personal injury or
wrongful death action at admiralty. Despite their designation as wards of
the courts, 26 seamen, like non-seamen, originally had no admiralty action
for wrongful death. In The Harrisburg,7 the U.S. Supreme Court held
20. See generally Schoenbaum, supra note 19, at 16-17.
21. Id. at 57.
22. See De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. 418. This opinion, written by the scholarly Judge Story, is considered
the seminal statement of the early expansion of U.S. admiralty law. He made clear that the United
States would not be bound by English law, but would alter this traditional law as the courts and
Congress found necessary. In De Lovio, Story expanded maritime contract jurisdiction past
traditional British limitations requiring that the contract be formed at sea, to a new standard requiring
only that the contract pertain to maritime commerce. See also 5 Stat. 726 (extending admiralty
jurisdiction to vessels employed in commerce on Great Lakes and their connecting waters).
23. 53 U.S. 443,457 (1851).
24. Id. at 452-53.
25. Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. 466, 468 (1851) (stating that "admiralty was not limited by tide-water,
but was extended to the lakes and navigable rivers of the United States").
26. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970). Seamen are considered
wards of the court because they continuously face the dangers of the sea and, trad tionally, have been
viewed paternally due to their supposed susceptibility to unsavory interests For an excellent
explanation of this principle, see Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239,246-47 (1942).
27. 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886).
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that, because most states had no wrongful death statutes, federal courts
should not create one at admiralty. By the early 1900s, however, most
states had adopted wrongful death statutes.28 Following their lead, the
federal government decided that it too should create a cause of action for
wrongful death at admiralty.29 In doing so, Congress also wanted to take
into account the special place of the seaman in the courts'
jurisprudence." In 1920, therefore, Congress adopted the Jones Act. 1
This statute recognized a federal wrongful death cause of action for
seamen who died in the course of their employment as a result of a
shipowner's negligence either on state territorial waters or on the high
seas.
32
That same year Congress also passed the Death on the High Seas
Act,33 which created a wrongful death cause of action for the families of
non-seamen killed on the high seas.34 At the time, Congress did not want
to displace the laws of those states who applied their own wrongful death
statutes within their territorial seas. 5 To preserve these causes of action,
Congress included section 7 of DOHSA 6
After 1920, seamen injured or killed anywhere on the navigable
waters of the world could pursue a tort action through the Jones Act. The
families of non-seamen killed at sea had a tort action under DOHSA, as
long as the death occurred outside a state's three-mile territorial sea.
Alternatively, non-seamen who were injured could recover through a
negligence action available at general maritime law. 7 Despite these laws,
however, a few situations remained where seamen and non-seamen alike
were without remedy. First, the estates of non-seamen killed inside the
territorial seas of states that did not have wrongful death statutes had no
28. See Stuart J. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 29, app. A (2d ed. 1975).
29. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408-09.
30. Martin J. Norris, The Law ofMaritime Personal Injuries § 6:2 (4th ed. 1990).
31. Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1995)).
32. § 688.
33. Pub. L. No. 66-165,41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. ch. 21 (1995)).
34. The "high seas" means the ocean outside a states' three-mile territorial seas or in foreign
territorial seas. See Moragne, Inc., 398 U.S. at 397-98.
35. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 224-25 (1986) (finding Congress
intended section 7 of DOHSA to preserve state jurisdiction of wrongful death actions within
territorial waters).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1995). This section states that DOHSA was not meant to displace state
causes of action available in the territorial seas.
37. General maritime law is a body of federal common law created by admiralty courts in a
variety of situations. David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26
. Mar. L. & Com. 325,329 n.24 (1995).
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common law or statutory method to recover damages. Second, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized a strict liability standard for certain federal
maritime wrongful death actions.38 Because most state wrongful death
statutes did not recognize strict liability, many seamen and non-seamen
killed within one of those states' territorial waters were denied a recovery
otherwise available under federal law.39
The Court did little to address the gap in maritime law until 1970,
when it decided Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.4" In that decision,
the Court recognized that the reasoning of The Harrisburg was no longer
appropriate because most states had adopted wrongful death statutes.4
The Court, therefore, created a general maritime law wrongful death
action applicable to non-seamen killed within a state's territorial seas.42
Many scholars had thought that the Moragne cause of action had
supplanted the application of state law to wrongful deaths inside a state's
territorial seas.43 The U.S. Supreme Court surprised them when it decided
otherwise in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun.'
II. YAMAHA MOTOR CORP. V CALHOUN
Yamaha began when Natalie Calhoun, a twelve-year-old girl who was
on vacation with her parents in Puerto Rico, slammed her rented jet-ski
into the side of a boat anchored off the beach in shallow waters.45 She
died instantly.46
The Calhouns brought an action in federal court in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania claiming that the jet-ski Natalie was riding was
defective.47 They asserted both diversity and admiralty jurisdiction.
Although their claim was maritime in nature, which normally calls for
the application of federal admiralty law, they sought to supplement the
38. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1944). Although an unseaworthiness
recovery is still governed by strict liability, it has since been limited to seamen. See Gibboney v.
Wright, 517 F.2d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Mahnich, 321 U.S. at 101.
39. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 388 (citing The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199,208 (1886)).
42. Id. at408.
43. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 37 (predicting that U.S. Supreme Court iould reverse appeals
court and find state law pre-empted in Yamaha).
44. 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
45. Id. at 622.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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usual admiralty remedies with state wrongful death damages, including
loss of society and other non-pecuniary measures.4 8 Most courts had not
recognized these damages for a general maritime wrongful death action.49
The Yamaha Corporation (Yamaha) argued that admiralty jurisdiction
mandated federal liability standards and exclusively federal remedies."
According to Yamaha, the general maritime wrongful death action
brought by the Calhouns was defined in Moragne v. State Marine Lines,
Inc.,5 which limited the Calhouns to only pecuniary losses. 2 The district
court, ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment, held that
application of state damage measures was inappropriate in light of
Moragne 3 However, contrary to the established law in several circuits, 4
the district court held that Moragne allowed the decedent's family to
recover for their loss of society, support, and services." Both parties
appealed to the Third Circuit. 6
The Court of Appeals determined that the district court had erred in
concluding that federal law pre-empted state remedies and reversed on
that basis. 7 After evaluating Moragne and its preceding cases, the Third
Circuit held that Moragne represented an extension of remedies, not a
reduction, because it created a remedy that had not previously existed. 8
They held, therefore, that it would run counter to the spirit of Moragne to
find that general maritime wrongful death actions exclude more generous
state remedies. 9 Yamaha appealed.6
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit and held that
the Calhouns could recover damages allowed by Pennsylvania's
48. Id
49. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
50. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 622.
51. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
52. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 622. Pecuniary losses are those that are directly compensatory in nature.
These include loss of future earnings, loss of nurture for children, funeral and hospital expenses, pre-
death pain and suffering, and, in a narrowing number of jurisdictions, loss of inheritance. Non-
pecuniary damages are repayments for losses that are more difficult to measure, such as loss of
society, loss of consortium, and, increasingly, loss of inheritance. Speiser, supra note 28, at 113-15.
53. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct at 622.
54. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
55. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct at 622.
56. Id.
57. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 40 F.3d 622, 625 (1994), aft'd, 116 S. Ct 619 (1996).
58. Id. at 642.
59. Id.
60. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct at 623.
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wrongful death statute to supplement federal remedies available under
admiralty law. 6' The Court first determined that there was federal
maritime jurisdiction because the case involved a watercraft collision on
navigable waters. 6' Then, after tracing the history of maritime wrongful
death actions in the Court's jurisprudence, a unanimous Court held that
the plaintiffs were still allowed to pursue state wrongful death remedies
if such remedies were available.63
In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the uniformity
concerns that had informed its decisions in several other cases, including
Moragne. The Court determined that these cases concerned the
availability of a maritime remedy, not the type of remedy available for
non-seamen. 6 The'Court thus dismissed Yamaha's argument that the
damage to the uniformity of maritime law caused by the application of
state remedies to a general maritime wrongful death action should be the
deciding factor in the case.
65
Having determined that a desire for uniformity would not direct their
decision about whether state remedies would be available to supplement
federal remedies for torts occurring in state waters, tie Court then
considered whether state remedies were pre-empted by federal law.66 It
reasoned that the Moragne Court had not prescribed a comprehensive
tort recovery scheme like Congress had with the Jones Act and DOHSA.
Therefore, Moragne did not pre-empt the procedure of tacking state
damage calculations onto federal ones in state territorial waters.67
Additionally, the Court held that Moragne was an extension of maritime
remedies, not a restriction; thus, it decided it would be against the spirit
of Moragne to use that holding to restrict the remedies available to the
plaintiff.68 For these reasons, the Court concluded that state remedies
were available to supplement federal remedies if a plaintiff chose to
pursue them.69
61. Id. at 629.
62. Id. at 623.
63. Id. at 629.
64. Id. at 627-28.
65. Id. at 626.
66. Id. at 628.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 627.
69. Id. at 629.
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III. CHOICE-OF-LAW ANALYSIS-STATE OR FEDERAL LAW?
The Yamaha Court erred in determining both that Moragne was not
intended as the sole basis for tort recovery for the families of non-seamen
killed in a state's territorial waters and that plaintiffs may look to state
remedies to supplement admiralty damage measures. If the Court had
more thoroughly examined the modes of analyses federal courts have
employed to resolve choice-of-law questions, it would have found that
state law was pre-empted by federal law. This section examines several
traditional factors in choice-of-law analysis and applies them to the facts
in Yamaha to demonstrate that the Court erred in finding that state
wrongful death recoveries may supplement those remedies available
through federal law.
A. Choice of Law Analysis and Its Application in Yamaha
State law may apply in an admiralty context when it does not displace
any significant federal interests. Thus, if local interests predominate over
federal interests, state law governs. Courts have employed various modes
of analysis to determine if state interests predominate. Two of these
modes are especially applicable to the facts in Yamaha.7" First, courts
often examine whether the state law to be applied would supplement, but
not contradict, an admiralty rule that constitutes a pervasive system.7' If
the admiralty rule in question is meant to be a pervasive system, and the
state law sought to be applied contradicts the federal rule, then the state
law is pre-empted.72 Second, courts often attempt to determine whether
the uniformity of maritime law is crucial in an area where state law might
70. There are additional factors that courts often examine. These include whether the state law to
be applied is substantive rather than procedural and whether the area of law is one in which the
outcome should be predictable and thus could be relied upon in determining primary conduct.
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994). Due to the limitations of this Note, a
discussion of these tests is omitted; however, it is this author's opinion that these tests would result
in the application of federal law. The remedy available for a cause of action is certainly substantive
law. Additionally, maritime tort is an area in which the outcome of one's actions should be
predictable, which would also call for the application of federal law. The importance of outcome
predictability is discussed infra at part IV.C. For a list of other tests that have been put forth, but
have been found lacking, see Robertson, supra note 37, at 338-46.
71. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-74 (1959); see also
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe
Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash.
2d 64, 83, 866 P.2d 15,25 (1994); see also Robertson, supra note 37, at 328.
72. Romero, 358 U.S. at 375.
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apply.73 If uniformity is important, then federal law must control to the
exclusion of state law. An examination of Yamaha in light of the well-
accepted factors described above, but not mentioned in the Yamaha
opinion, reveals that the Court erred in allowing state remedies to
supplement federal general maritime law wrongful death recoveries as
defined by Moragne.
B. Choice-of-Law Questions in Maritime Wrongful Death Context
The U.S. Supreme Court has looked at the interplay between state and
federal law in a wrongful death context in past cases, where it has
supplied hints as to some of the federal interests that would pre-empt
state law. These cases provide the fabric from which the Yamaha Court
wove its flawed determination that state law could supplement the
federal remedies applicable to a federal general maritime law wrongful
death action.
One early case that considered this interplay was The Harrisburg.74 In
that case the U.S. Supreme Court held that because the majority of states
did not have wrongful death laws, a federal court sitting in admiralty
would not recognize a wrongful death action.75 Many courts
subsequently balked at the harshness of this rule. They were particularly
concerned with the potential unfairness caused by the possibility that a
shipowner liable for someone's death might be less harshly punished
than one who merely caused an injury.76 As a result, courts began
applying state wrongful death law to supplement admiralty law where the
state in question had a wrongful death statute.77 This practice continued
until the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a strict liability cause of action
at admiralty for certain kinds of harms.78 In the waters of those states
with wrongful death laws that did not recognize a strict liability cause of
action, however, some individuals were again left without all the causes
of action otherwise available to them. This gap in wrongful death
recovery became especially troublesome after 1959, when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that lower courts applying a state's wrongful
73. See I Friedell, supra note 4, § 112; see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216
(1917).
74. 119U.S. 199(1886).
75. See id. at 213-14.
76. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,395 (1970).
77. See Norris, supra note 30, § 6:2; see also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619,
624 (1996).
78. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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death statute in admiralty had to apply that state's liability determination
as well as its applicable damage equations.79
It was against this backdrop that the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,0 which created a maritime law
wrongful death action applicable to non-seamen killed within a state's
three-mile wide territorial sea.8 ' The Court concluded that the
justification for The Harrisburg had become null and void and that it
should be overruled.82 To reach this conclusion, the Court looked at
congressional intent in enacting DOHSA and the Jones Act as well as
existing state law. As a result, the Court determined that the vast majority
of jurisdictions had adopted a wrongful death statute, and that Congress
had expressed a willingness to recognize wrongful death actions through
DOHSA and the Jones Act. The Court then accordingly filled the gap left
by DOHSA and created a general maritime law wrongful death action
that could be applied within each state's three-mile territorial sea. 3
Three important cases that outlined wrongful death jurisprudence in
the admiralty courts followed Moragne. The first such case was Mobil
Oil Co. v. Higginbotham.' There, oil workers were killed on the high
seas in a helicopter crash en route to an offshore oil platform." Their
widows attempted to supplement tort damages available through
DOHSA with the federal remedy created in Moragne.86 The Court held
that, if a death occurred on the high seas, only DOHSA would apply
because of congressional intent that DOHSA create the sole remedy for
survivors of non-Jones Act seamen killed through another's negligence
on the high seas.87 Higginbotham thus clarified that Moragne did not
create legal rights for a non-seaman outside of a state's territorial seas. 8
79. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959) (holding that when admiralty court is
applying state law, it is not creating general maritime law and is therefore not free to apply only
remedy or standard of liability; holding instead that it must apply law as whole, meaning that
admiralty court could not apply state remedy to admiralty unseaworthiness strict-liability action).
80. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
81. Id. at409.
82. Id. at 388, 409.
83. Id. at 409.
84. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
85. Id. at 619.
86. Id. at 625.
87. Id. As discussed above, DOHSA provides a remedy for those killed on the high seas. The
Jones Act provides remedies for seamen who are injured while in the service of their employer. See
supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
88. Mobil Oil, 436 U.S. at 625.
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The second important case was Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire."9
In that case, the widows of two oil workers killed on an oil platform on
the high seas outside of Louisiana's territorial waters attempted to
recover damages through Louisiana's state wrongful death statute.9" The
Court held that a plaintiff could not recover via a state wrongful death
statute when the death occurred on the high seas because outside the state
seas, only DOHSA may apply.9" In so holding, the Court found that
section 7 of DOHSA, which provides that any provisions of any state
statute should not be affected by the act,92 was to be interpreted only as a
clause allowing states to apply their wrongful death statutes within their
territorial waters.93 Section 7, it held, was not meant to give state law
preclusive effect.94 The Court concluded, therefore, that because
Congress intended DOHSA to apply to deaths occurring on the high seas,
state wrongful death statutes could not have any effect on the law outside
of the states' territorial seas.95
Finally, in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,96 the Court held that wrongful
death damages under Moragne were limited to pecuniary damages
only.9 7 The opinion was based, in part, on Congress's intent, as expressed
in DOHSA and the Jones Act, to limit the damages recoverable to
pecuniary losses.98 The Court also wanted to provide a uniform remedy
for all maritime wrongful death actions."
These cases form the bulwark of the U.S. Supreme Court's case law
regarding maritime wrongful death actions and their interaction with
state wrongful death statutes. In all of these cases, the Court addressed
the concept of uniformity to some extent, whether acknowledging its
importance, or explaining why it was not applicable to the facts. For
example, Miles illustrates that the concept of uniformity of maritime law
can be a controlling federal interest that may pre-empt state law. 00
Congressional intent to create a pervasive system of recoveries at
89. 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 231-32.
92. 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1995).
93. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 220-21.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 232.
96. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 31-32.
99. Id.
100. Id. at33.
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admiralty also might elevate federal law over state law.1"1 The traditional
modes of analysis used to determine if state law is applicable reflect
these concerns and demonstrate that the Yamaha Court misread and
unduly minimized federal interests in determining that state law applied.
C. Moragne Articulates a Pervasive System of Wrongful Death Actions
That Pre-empts State Laws
State law may be applied if it supplements, but does not contradict, an
admiralty rule that does not constitute a pervasive system.' °2 In Yamaha,
the Court ignored Congress's intent in passing DOHSA and the Court's
past jurisprudence when it determined that Moragne was not meant to
establish a pervasive system of recoveries. 3 Additionally, state remedies
contradict established maritime law because admiralty law has already
set forth the applicable remedies. Therefore, the Yamaha Court erred in
allowing the plaintiffs to recover state remedies in addition to the federal
recoveries defined in Moragne.
1. The Yamaha Court Erred by Determining that Moragne Does Not
Constitute a Pervasive System
Contrary to the findings of Yamaha, the wrongful death cause of
action created in Moragne excludes state causes of action. When the
Court created a general maritime law wrongful death action, it intended
to create a pervasive system, one that was not meant to be supplemented
by state law. The Moragne Court suggested that lower courts interpreting
this newly created general maritime law wrongful death action should
consult maritime personal injury law to fill the necessary gaps."
Additionally, section 7 of DOHSA does not support the position that the
Moragne action was meant to coexist with state law, as asserted by the
Yamaha Court. 5 Therefore, state damages should have been pre-empted
by the general maritime wrongful death action.
If the facts of Yamaha arose under maritime personal injury law, state
law would have been pre-empted, and the general maritime law would
have constituted the only scheme of recovery. In a maritime personal
101. Mobil Oil Co. v. Higgenbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
102. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
103. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 628 (1996).
104. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405-06 (1970).
105. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
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injury case, federal courts create federal common law by adopting rules
and precedents based on particular state laws or general trends in the
legal system. Once adopted, the borrowed law becomes binding as
federal general maritime law in that circuit." 6 Because the new law
becomes precedent, any conflicting law in that circuit that might have
previously applied is pre-empted to the extent that it conflicts with the
new law.0 7
According to the Moragne Court, the general maritime wrongful death
action it created was to develop similarly."0 8 As the Moragne action was
interpreted and clarified by the courts, they adopted pieces of state law,
including damages, as federal law.0 9 When a court defined one of the
elements of the general maritime law wrongful death action, conflicting
state law in that circuit was pre-empted." ° Many courts interpreted
Moragne as limiting damages to pecuniary damages."' This limitation
then pre-empted all non-pecuniary damages, both state and federal, in
that circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court in Yamaha, however, ignored the
decisions of the lower courts and mistakenly concluded that non-
pecuniary damages were not pre-empted.
In addition, the Yamaha Court also misunderstood and misapplied the
reasoning behind section 7 of DOHSA. The Yamaha Court read this
section as evidence that Congress intended to allow state law to supplant
federal law in admiralty jurisdiction, not just to fill the holes left by
federal maritime laws."2 Thus, the Court held that section 7 was
specifically designed to prevent DOHSA from applying in state waters."'
The Court reasoned that, because Congress did not pre-empt state law in
the state's territorial seas when it had the opportunity, state damages
were still available to the plaintiffs in Yamaha."4
106. See Schoenbaum, supra note 19, at 123; see also Robertson, supra note 37, at 362-63.
107. See Schoenbaum, supra note 19, at 123.
108. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 405-06.
109. See Mobil Oil Co. v. Higgenbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1978) (describing evolution of
wrongful death action); see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 513, 584 (1974) (allowing
for recovery of loss of society under Moragne action). It is important to note that Gaudet has been
severely limited and is applicable only to longshoremen. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19,31 (1990).
110. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica DeLeval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 (1986)
("Drawn from state and federal sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional
common law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.").
111. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
112. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct 619, 628 (1996).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court's logic, however, fails to take into account
the circumstances surrounding the passage of DOHSA, especially the
time during which it was passed. When Congress approved DOHSA in
1920, maritime law still strained under the yoke of The Harrisburg,
which did not recognize a general maritime law wrongful death action." 5
Congress altered this situation by passing DOHSA, but it wished to
preserve state recoveries for wrongful death actions brought on behalf of
non-seamen killed on the states' territorial seas. It therefore added
section 7, which was meant to allow states to provide a cause of action
where federal law was not applicable." 6 Congress enacted section 7 to
avoid the confusion of creating a new system of recovery when the ad
hoc system developed by many federal admiralty courts of applying state
wrongful death remedies in territorial waters was already operating
smoothly.
17
In determining that section 7 of DOHSA supported its position, the
Yamaha Court failed to look at the legislative history and the arguments
supporting section 7 when it was proposed. The original draft of section
7 stated that "the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating
rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this Act as
to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any State."' 8
When section 7 was enacted, however, ihis phrase was missing, implying
that Congress intended to exclude the application of all state laws once
the federal courts had granted admiralty jurisdiction." 9 In fact, courts
continued to supplement the general maritime law with state law until the
Court's decision in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co. 2 recognized a strict
liability cause of action, creating several contradictions with state
wrongful death statutes. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court
realized the necessity of recognizing a maritime wrongful death action to
provide a remedy to those who, because of the strict liability
unseaworthiness cause of action recognized in Mahnich, were now being
denied a recovery otherwise available. Thus, in Moragne, the Court
recognized a federal general maritime wrongful death action.'
115. 119U.S. 199,213 (1886).
116. See 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1995).
117. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 397-98 (1970).
118. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920).
119. See 46 U.S.C. § 767.
120. 321 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1994).
121. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
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Many lower courts also believed that section 7 was intended to
continue to allow a state remedy only until a federal one was provided.
Therefore, most of these jurisdictions held that when the general
maritime law action was recognized, state law should have been pre-
empted.'22 Many of these jurisdictions explicitly stated that that the
reasoning of section 7 had become moot, and the section, thus, no longer
was persuasive.'
The Moragne Court itself looked at the congressional debate
surrounding section 7 of DOHSA to determine if Congress had provided
a guide as to when federal or state law should apply in a wrongful death
context. The Court's examination revealed that Congress passed section
7 to preserve state wrongful death causes of action in admiralty within
the states' territorial seas. The Court reasoned that in so doing, Congress
was attempting to avoid complicating its newly created admiralty system
of recoveries by continuing to allow states to enforce their wrongful
death laws within their territorial seas.'24 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court determined that a discussion of DOHSA on the floor of the House
revealed a concern that a DOHSA cause of action only be provided in
cases where there was not a remedy, which meant deaths outside of the
state's territorial seas."z Thus, the Moragne Court believed that section 7
of DOHSA was meant only to ensure that states that were already
applying their wrongful death statutes in their territorial waters could
continue to do so.126
The Moragne Court, when it created a general maritime wrongful
death action, recognized why Congress had reserved the territorial seas
for state actions. However, because Mahnich created a gap in the Court's
system of recovery for wrongful death, it became necessary to create a
new cause of action.'27 The system that had been running smoothly since
122. See, e.g., Kelly v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 26 F.3d 597, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker v.
Braus, 995 F.2d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1993); see also infra note 123 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Preston v. Frantz 11 F.3d 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 31
(1994); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr.
& Assocs., 466 F.2d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 1972); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 82-
83 (D. Conn. 1993); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 692 F. Supp. 764, 771-73 (W.D. Mich. 1988),
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990); Gilmore v. Witschorek,
411 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Ill. 1976). But see Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that because Gaudet is still applicable to non-seamen, loss of society damages are still
available).
124. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397.
125. Id.; see also Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 225, 228 (1986).
126. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 398.
127. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
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1920-the one that section 7 had been designed to preserve-had
become outdated. Thus, the Court made Congress's original rationale in
passing section 7 of DOHSA moot by creating a new system of
recoveries to replace the old one. The Yamaha Court's reliance on this
section for its assertion that state law was preserved even after Moragne
was therefore misplaced.
Because Congress included section 7 of DOHSA to preserve state
wrongful death actions where there was no remedy at the time, the
Yamaha Court erred in viewing it as evidence that Congress intended to
allow state law to supplant federal maritime law. Furthermore, the
language of Moragne indicates that when the lower courts decided what
damages were available under the general maritime wrongful death
action, other conflicting damages were precluded. Therefore, in light of
the legislative history of DOHSA, the Moragne Court's own view of the
extent of the problem it was correcting, and the Court's opinion as to
how the wrongful death action it had recognized should be developed,
the Yamaha Court erred in finding that Moragne did not constitute a
pervasive system of recovery.
2. Yamaha Remedies Contradict Established Admiralty Law
Not only did Moragne create a pervasive federal system of recovery,
state law contradicts, rather than supplements, the federal standard.
Therefore, under a traditional choice-of-law analysis, state law should
have been pre-empted.
Some state wrongful death statutes, including Pennsylvania's, allow
for recovery of non-pecuniary damages such as loss of society and
punitive damages.' However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp.'29 specifically held that a wrongful death plaintiff could
only recover pecuniary damages through the general maritime law
wrongful death action because non-pecuniary damages, even in a
Moragne action, were inconsistent with the Jones Act. Several lower
courts have viewed Miles as precluding non-pecuniary damages for
Moragne actions brought by non-seamen, as these damages would be
128. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8301 (West 1992); see also Altamuroj v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F.
Supp. 870, 878-79 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that Pennsylvania statute allows for recovery of loss of
society). For other state wrongful death statutes, see Speiser, supra note 28.
129. 498 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1990). The Jones Act only allows seamen to recover pecuniary
damages. Because the plaintiff was a seaman, the Court held that he was limited to pecuniary
damages even under the general maritime law.
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inconsistent with the damages generally allowed at admiralty. 3° Thus,
courts that would apply a state remedy allowing for non-pecuniary
damages are not supplementing federal law, but are providing an entirely
different, contradictory scheme of recovery. The Yamaha Court
incorrectly took a different position and held that a non-seaman plaintiff
who is bringing a wrongful death claim from an accident in territorial
waters may choose to seek either state or federal recovery schemes
depending, most likely, on whichever are more beneficial to the
plaintiff.'
As discussed above, Moragne was meant to constitute a pervasive
scheme of recovery, despite the Yamaha Court's assertion that section 7
of DOHSA evidenced an intent to allow state law to apply in the states'
territorial seas. Additionally, state non-pecuniary damages contradict, not
supplement federal law. Therefore, according to traditional choice-of-law
standards applied by admiralty courts to determine whether state or
federal law should apply in a maritime wrongful death context, federal
law should have controlled in Yamaha.
D. The Yamaha Decision Wrongfully Assaults the Needed Uniformity
ofMaritime Law
A second major factor that courts have weighed to determine whether
state or federal law should apply is whether the uniformity principle of
admiralty law is crucial to achieving the goals of maritime commerce.'32
The Yamaha Court misinterpreted previous cases in finding that the
uniformity concerns enunciated earlier in the jurisprudence of the Court
were of a different magnitude than those presented by the facts in
Yamaha. Specifically, the Court erred in holding that the uniformity of
130. See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1092 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that "overwhelming" majority of courts are against allowing for loss of society damages for
wrongful death action); see also Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119, 122-23 (5th
Cir. 1994); Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 987-89 (5th Cir. 1989), affd sub noma. Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 692 F. Supp. 764, 770-72 (W.D.
Mich. 1988); Robertson, supra note 37, at 372 (stating that although great weight of authority
refuses to grant loss of society damages under general maritime law wrongful death action, issue not
completely settled).
131. SeeYamahaMotorCorp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 628-29 (1996).
132. Although the uniformity argument will be extensively addressed in part II, it is necessary in
this section briefly to address uniformity so as to refute the assertion in Yamaha that uniformity is
not a major concern in the area of maritime wrongful death remedies. This section will address the
value of the uniformity of maritime law, whereas part EIl will assume this value because of its
prominence in the Court's decisions on jurisdiction and point out the contradiction between the
sudden de-emphasis of uniformity in Yamaha and the Court's expanded tests for jurisdiction.
Vol. 72:181, 1997
Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law Problems in Yamaha
remedies is not as important as the uniform availability of a cause of
action. Because uniformity of remedies in maritime tort law is crucial,
and because the Court misread past jurisprudence, the Court erred in
finding that state law could still supplement the general maritime law
wrongful death action created in Moragne.
There is a great need for uniformity in the context of maritime law,
particularly in maritime tort law or other areas where foreign commerce
may regularly be affected.'33 Such uniformity is important because
foreign commerce interests need to be able to act with a degree of
certainty when shipping goods to and from the United States. In fact, this
need originally inspired the decision to confer federal jurisdiction in
admiralty causes of action.134 The uniformity of maritime tort law
continues to be instrumental in ensuring that vessel operators can predict
the consequences of their conduct through adherence to uniform rules of
conduct enforced through a uniform system of remedies.13
Although the Yamaha Court acknowledged that uniformity was an
important factor to be weighed in a choice-of-law analysis, it found that
the uniformity concerns presented by the case were both different in
nature and less important than those discussed in Moragne and other
cases.'36 According to the Court, the earlier concerns addressed by these
cases centered around whether or not a cause of action was available, not
which remedies were available.'37 This is an incorrect analysis of the
Court's maritime wrongful death jurisprudence. Commentators have
argued that determining what remedy is available is just as important as
whether a remedy is available at all, as it is the remedy that often creates
the deterrence upon which actors base their conduct. 3 ' By narrowly
reading Moragne and its progeny, the Yamaha Court failed to consider
the important reasons why the Court's prior cases were concerned about
133. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874); see also American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 458 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing importance of federal maritime law is
maintaining free flow of maritime commerce).
134. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Miles, 498 U.S. at 31-36; Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 230
(1986); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970).
136. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 626.
137. Id
138. See Richard A. Posner, TortLaw: Cases and Economic Analysis 121 (1982) ("The threat of
having to pay heavy damages will reduce the incidence of tortious conduct, and so increase social
welfare").
Washington Law Review
uniformity in the first instance: a desire to create a system where
shipowners could predict the consequences of their actions.'39
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham4 ' provides the only jurisprudential
support the Yamaha Court could have drawn upon for its position that
uniformity is not of primary magnitude in maritime wrongful death
choice-of-law decisions. A closer examination, however, reveals that the
reasoning in Higginbotham is inapplicable to Yamaha. In Higginbotham,
the Court held that, even though its decision that DOHSA plaintiffs were
limited to non-pecuniary damages would hurt the uniformity of maritime
law,"' uniformity must be superseded by clear congressional intent. 42
Yamaha, by contrast, did not involve a congressional act, but rather
common law in the form of the judicially-created general maritime law
wrongful death action. 43 In Yamaha, there was no will of Congress to
override the recognized need for uniformity of admiralty law, and thus
the logic behind Higginbotham was inapplicable.
Higginbotham not only fails to support the Yamaha Court's position,
it directly contradicts the Yamaha reasoning for de-emphasizing
uniformity. Yamaha drew a distinction between ensuring the uniformity
of remedies and ensuring the uniform availability of an action.' In an
important footnote in Higginbotham, Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, reasoned that "[w]hen Moragne was decided, fatal accidents on
the high seas had an adequate federal remedy, while the same accidents
nearer shore might yield more generous awards, or none at all,
depending on the law of the nearest state."' 45 The Higginbotham Court
was thus cognizant of the importance of uniform awards, including their
size and kind. Moragne, according to Justice Stevens's footnote, was
designed to provide a uniform system of awards, none more generous
than the other, even though in Higginbotham this uniformity had been
subordinated to congressional intent. The logic behind Stevens's footnote
thus contradicts the Yamaha Court's conclusion that the uniformity of
remedies is of a different magnitude than the uniform availability of a
cause of action.
139. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
140. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
141. This is because, at that time, the general maritime law wrongful death action recognized
some pecuniary damages that have since been limited by most courts. See supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
142. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624.
143. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 628 (1996).
144. Id. at 626.
145. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624 n.18 (emphasis added).
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The importance of uniform remedies was further emphasized by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.146 In that case, the
uniformity of admiralty law was the cornerstone of the Court's decision
to limit Moragne plaintiffs to pecuniary damages so that they could only
have the same remedies available to Jones Act or DOHSA plaintiffs.' 47 It
seems unlikely that the uniformity concerns expressed only five years
ago in Miles have eroded to the degree expressed by the Court in
Yamaha.4 '
Nor should Congress's unseized opportunity to grant an exclusive
cause of action to Moragne plaintiffs when it passed DOHSA and the
Jones Act be determinative of whether Congress has spoken as to the
importance of uniformity in the area of maritime wrongful death.
Although Congress could have created a cause of action for non-seamen
injured in the states' territorial seas when it passed DOHSA in 1920,
such action was not necessary.'49 The lower courts had devised their own
system of recoveries using state wrongful death statutes, and Congress
was willing to let that system stand as long as the system provided a
recovery for every individual. 5 ' Congress did not want to create a
uniform system of recoveries because the bifurcated system that allowed
states to apply their wrongful death statutes in their territorial seas
functioned fairly and consistently until Mahnich was decided. Therefore,
although Congress could have created a uniform system for maritime
wrongful death when it passed DOHSA, its failure to do so should not be
viewed as proof that Congress believed that the uniformity of maritime
tort law was not of vital importance.
Finally, the Court's decision regarding uniformity also contradicts the
trend in lower courts' decisions regarding maritime wrongful death based
on the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier insistence on a uniform maritime
146. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
147. Id at 31-36.
148. See Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 628 (citing Miles for proposition that where Congress has
mandated scheme of recovery, it cannot be expanded upon).
149. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 397-98 (1970). The Court stated
that:
Congress, in acting to fill [the void created by a lack of a federal wrongful death statute],
legislated only to the three-mile limit because that was the extent of the problem. The express
provision that state remedies in territorial waters were not disturbed by the Act ensured that
Congress' solution of one problem would not create another.
Id.
150. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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law.15' Although the U.S. Supreme Court is in no way bound to follow
the lower courts, it is important to note the unanimity with which the
lower courts responded to what they perceived as an emphasis on
uniformity of maritime law. Because the U.S. Supreme Court had
emphasized uniformity again and again in its prior decisions in maritime
tort, the lower courts understandably came to accept this as a motivating
factor in their decisions.1
52
The Court's departure from these uniformity principle concerns in
Yamaha is not supported in its previous jurisprudence, including
Higginbotham, nor is it the result of the presence of congressional intent
to de-emphasize uniformity for another purpose. Rather, the Yamaha
Court's decision that uniformity was not an important factor was
motivated by an unwarranted distinction between the availability of
remedies and the availability of a cause of action. Because both remedial
and jurisdictional uniformity are crucial to maritime law wrongful death
actions, federal law, not state law, should have provided the sole remedy
to the Calhouns.
The availability of state law is inappropriate in Yamaha and cases like
it, even to supplement federal recoveries. The Moragne recovery was
meant to be a pervasive system at the time it was decided. Furthermore,
state law supplants, rather than supplements, federal law because state
law may allow for pecuniary damages, which are not allowed in any
wrongful death recovery at maritime law. Therefore, under well-
established standards, state law should not apply in this case. The
Yamaha Court created dubious and problematic precedent by finding that
state law was still applicable, especially when confronted with the
conflict that comes from granting admiralty jurisdiction without applying
federal maritime law.
IV. GRANTING ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION BUT NOT
APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE MARITIME LAW CREATES
UNRESOLVABLE CONFLICT
By deciding that there was not enough federal interest to provide a
uniform federal remedy, but that there was enough federal interest to
151. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
152. For an excellent example of a lower court's reasoning in finding the uniformity principle
essential in a clash between state and federal remedies, see Wahistrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus.,
Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1090 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that Moragne addressed specific issue of what
remedies available at admiralty, and limiting plaintiff to federal non-pecuniary damages).
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sustain federal jurisdiction, the Yamaha Court created a contradiction.
The underlying reason for establishing maritime jurisdiction is to provide
a uniform set of laws to encourage foreign commerce.' 53 In response,
courts have expanded federal admiralty jurisdiction to cover any
situation where maritime commerce is likely to be disrupted.' 54 This
interest in uniformity, however, is not served by the Court's decision to
allow plaintiffs to pursue state remedies in situations such as those in
Yamaha.
A. Review ofAdmiralty Jurisdiction
Admiralty tort jurisdiction was originally established to provide a
uniform set of rules to encourage a fledgling maritime commercial
industry. 55 The federal government realized that it needed to provide a
consistent code of conduct for maritime commerce so that merchants
could accurately predict the consequences of their actions while in the
territorial waters of the United States. 56
Admiralty courts in the United States traditionally looked to the
location where a tort occurred to determine whether federal courts would
have jurisdiction over the matter.' 57 However, as time progressed, the
Court realized that more factors were needed in the test to reflect proper
federal interests in resolving maritime controversies. Thus, its test for
jurisdiction slowly evolved, although until 1970 maritime tort
jurisdiction was still mostly based on the location of the tort.'
The Court began to add other major factors to the "location test"
because of the evolution of varying forms of transportation, including
airline travel and pleasure boating. The first major change in the Court's
jurisdictional test came in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland.'59 In that case, a plane crashed into Lake Erie shortly after
takeoff.6 The U.S. Supreme Court held that, in order for there to be
admiralty jurisdiction, the actions in question must relate in some way to
153. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
154. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 365 (1990).
155. 1 Friedell, supra note 4, § 105 (1996).
156. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
159. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
160. Id. at 250.
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traditional maritime activity, as well as occur on navigable waters.' The
test was further modified in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson.'62 In
establishing that there was admiralty jurisdiction for a collision of two
pleasure boats in a seldomly-used shipping channel, the Court held that
an action that has the potential to affect maritime commerce is
sufficiently related to traditional maritime activity to confer admiralty
jurisdiction.'63  Despite protests that its decision in Foremost
overexpanded federal admiralty jurisdiction,1" the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principles expressed in Foremost in Sisson v. Ruby.'65 The
Court, in finding admiralty jurisdiction appropriate, held that lower
courts are to examine the general nature of the conduct that conferred
jurisdiction, not the facts surrounding that specific conduct, in order to
determine if the conduct would affect maritime commerce.'l
Maritime jurisdiction has thus evolved from a simple location test to a
more complex test designed to measure the federal interest in granting
jurisdiction. First, one must determine whether or not the accident
occurred on navigable waters, meaning waters capable of carrying
maritime commerce. Second, one must determine whether the activity in
question was traditionally maritime in nature and had the potential to
affect maritime commerce. If both of these prongs are met, federal
maritime jurisdiction is appropriate.
B. Resolving the Conflict Presented by Yamaha: Enough Federal
Interest for Jurisdiction, But Not Enough for a Uniform System of
Admiralty Remedies.
The Yamaha Court's desire to preserve state remedies in a maritime
wrongful death action clashes with the purpose behind expanding
admiralty jurisdiction-the provision of uniform standards and remedies
where federal interests exist. If there is enough of a federal interest to
161. Id. at 268 (holding that plane crash during overland flight lacked significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity and that maritime jurisdiction was thus inappropriate).
162. 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982) (holding that boat accident in remote bayou had potential to affect
maritime commerce).
163. Id. at 677.
164. See, e.g., Phyllis D. Camilla & Michael P. Drzal, Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson: If
this is Water, It Must Be Admiralty, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1983) (noting that Foremost extended
admiralty jurisdiction to "the edge of absurdity").
165. 497 U.S. 358, 363-34 (1990).
166. Id. at 367 (holding that fire on docked yacht involved traditional maritime activity of
moorage).
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confer federal jurisdiction, or, in other words, if the tort in question may
potentially affect maritime commerce, then a uniform law should be
applied. In determining that federal jurisdiction existed, the Yamaha
Court acknowledged that the case raised an issue that had enough
potential to affect maritime commerce to grant federal jurisdiction. By
doing so, it held, in effect, that there was enough of a significant federal
interest involved to warrant federal jurisdiction.
Despite its reasoning regarding federal jurisdiction, however, the
Yamaha Court held that when an accident involved non-seamen in
territorial waters, federal interests were not sufficient to necessitate
applying a uniform set of wrongful death remedies.'67 The Court
therefore allowed the plaintiff to pursue state wrongful death remedies in
addition to federal remedies.
168
This discrepancy creates a conflict. The principle behind granting
federal jurisdiction and mandating a uniform system of remedies is the
same: to encourage maritime commerce through predictable standards.
The Court's determination that the principle applies to jurisdiction, but
not to the availability of remedies, is confusing and inappropriate.
During oral argument, the Yamaha Court openly questioned whether
there was enough federal interest to allow federal courts to keep
jurisdiction of cases such as Yamaha. 69 The brief jurisdictional analysis
set forth by the Court in its opinion, however, belies the probing nature
of the debate that took place regarding jurisdiction during oral argument.
While questioning the Calhouns' attorneys, the Court asked whether
there was, in fact, a sufficient federal interest in recreational boating
accidents to allow for federal admiralty jurisdiction.7 ' After the
attorney's reply, the Court stated that it did not want "to continue to
develop wrongful death rules in territorial waters where we don't really
have that much of an interest."''
Despite orally admitting that there was little federal interest, the Court,
in its published opinion, allowed for jurisdiction. Without citing any
authority or explaining its decision, the Court instead disposed of the
jurisdictional issue in one short sentence, concluding that a collision by
167. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 626-28 (1996).
168. Id. at 629.
169. Oral Argument at *9, Yamaha, 1995 WL 648001 (No. 94-1387).
170. Id. at *9-*10.
171. Id.
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watercraft on navigable waters automatically brought admiralty
jurisdiction.172
The Court's determination that admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate
simply because the collision occurred on navigable waters ignores the
reasoning behind a grant of federal jurisdiction. The Court applied a test
to determine if federal admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate without
considering whether that test served the purpose of defining the federal
interest. This blind application allowed the contradiction between
jurisdictional and remedial uniformity to arise. Because uniformity of
jurisdiction and remedy are merely different representations of the same
principle, it seems the logical conclusion is that if there is not a federal
interest significant enough to provide a uniform system of remedies, then
there is not enough federal interest in uniformity to confer admiralty
jurisdiction. By the same token, once a court determines that there is
enough federal interest to confer jurisdiction, then it should uphold the
principle of uniformity in its choice-of-law decisions as well. The
contradiction created by the Court in deciding otherwise portends several
problems in maritime wrongful death law.
C. Problems Presented by Confusion Between the Application of State
or Federal Law in Admiralty Jurisdiction: Choice-of-Law
Difficulties, Economic Uncertainty, and Forum Shopping
Applying state law in addition to federal law creates several problems
that will hinder maritime commerce and may lead to confusion and
unpredictability in the lower courts. The applicability of state law makes
it difficult for foreign commerce interests to predict accurately the
consequences of their conduct. Further, it encourages forum shopping by
plaintiffs. Finally, it creates several confusing questions regarding how
courts will conduct their choice-of-law analysis between state and federal
law in areas other than remedies.
By allowing state law and federal law to apply in a wrongful death
context at admiralty, Yamaha has the potential to damage maritime
commerce interests. Before Yamaha, a shipowner knew that, regardless
of whether a death occurred within the state's territorial waters or on the
high seas, a plaintiff would be limited to pecuniary damages. These
damages may be measured and predicted more easily than non-pecuniary
damages. This is because pecuniary damages are compensatory in nature
172. Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 623 ("Because this case involves a watercraft collision on navigable
waters, it falls within admiralty's domain.").
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and are generally very specific and provable, whereas non-pecuniary
damages attempt to attach value to an intangible and are, by their very
nature, more nebulous and unpredictable.173 After Yamaha, shipowners
are exposed to a wide array of state damage formulas and thus may be
unable to measure accurately their exposure to loss. Judge Posner and
others have argued convincingly that this unpredictability hinders the
proper allocation of economic resources. 74
In product liability cases such as Yamaha, ambiguity may not be as
damaging because there is already some uncertainty as to which law will
apply to companies that ship their products to several different
jurisdictions. In other areas, however, ambiguity adds unnecessary
uncertainty and unpredictability to a situation that would be otherwise
clear. Shipowners, particularly owners of liners that carry several non-
seaman passengers, will be frustrated by their inability to predict the
consequences of their conduct. Because laymen and attorneys often find
choice-of-law problems unfathomable,'75 it is unlikely that vessel owners
will be able to make the difficult determination of knowing which law
may govern their actions. This in turn leads to a difficulty in allocating
resources.
For example, one state may allow for recovery of loss of society,
while another may not. If vessel owners knew that in all cases companies
would be responsible for paying a surviving family for their non-
pecuniary damages such as loss of society, owners could measure their
potential economic liability, compare it to the available safeguards, then
decide the level of safety precautions they needed to achieve maximum
economic efficiency.'76 Without that certainty, an owner may be unable
to measure accurately his or her potential loss, making accurate cost-
benefit analysis and proper economic choices more difficult for the
owner. The addition of uncertainty to the owners' calculated exposure to
173. Speiser, supra note 28, at 103-07.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 176-178. See generally Posner, supra note 138, at 1-5
(describing basic theory of how tort defendants can reach maximum economic efficiency). Any
added uncertainty means that the shipowner is unable to discern what the costs of the accident may
be. An accident cost will be much different if non-pecuniary damages are included. Owners use
accident costs to measure their exposure to liability. This exposure then dictates what economic
resources will be allocated to risk prevention, depending upon how risk-averse the owner is. Not
knowing whether non-pecuniary damages are available adds uncertainty to an owner's accident cost
determination, which may lead the owner either to over- or under-allocate resources into risk
prevention. This inefficient allocation is minimized by providing one set of damages applicable to
non-seamen admiralty plaintiffs. Id
175. See James A.R. Nafziger, Conflicts of Laws: A Northwest Perspective 1 (1985).
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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liability, may lead them to misallocate resources. This, in turn, will
hinder maritime commerce because the resulting unpredictability will
lead to a waste of economic resources by the shipowners.
77
Furthermore, several questions arise from Yamaha regarding how
choice-of-law questions are to be resolved as the lines between state
jurisdictions are very unclear out at sea. Uncertainty is heightened by
introducing several different laws where only one was applicable before.
What if an accident occurs while a ship is in shared or disputed waters?
What if the location of the accident is uncertain? For instance, what if
someone dies in their state room on a yacht cruise up the coast of the
United States through some negligence of the boat owner, but no one is
quite sure when? Does the family get to apply any of the state laws that
may be available to them? Or must the courts estimate time of death and
speed of the ship to determine which state law would apply? The
difficulties in allowing individual state laws to have force quickly
become apparent. The best course would be to avoid these confusing
questions, because the presence of an appropriate federal admiralty
remedy means that the application of state remedies serves no
meaningful purpose in the first place.
Unfortunately, Yamaha may also promote forum shopping. Courts
have consistently viewed forum shopping as being undesirable because it
can provide an unfair advantage to plaintiffs.'78 The jurisdiction, not the
facts, could determine the results of the case. The Court's decision in
Yamaha encourages forum shopping in that plaintiffs may look at the
several jurisdictions and applicable laws available to them to find the
most favorable state law for their claim. A general maritime wrongful
death rule avoids this problem as there would be only one set of remedies
available regardless of the forum.
Because maritime law was meant to encourage maritime commerce,
any practices that inhibit the flow of commerce should be viewed
skeptically. By allowing state wrongful death law to apply in the state
territorial seas, the Yamaha Court needlessly restricted maritime
commerce. The decision encourages uncertainty and makes it difficult
for shipowners to properly allocate their economic resources. It also
encourages forum shopping. These factors consequently damage the flow
of shipping to and from the United States. Given the shaky doctrinal
foundations of Yamaha, the confusion between jurisdiction and
177. See Posner, supra note 138, at 1-5.
178. See Erie R.R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938); see also Ianna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (describing Erie as attack on evil of forum shopping).
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uniformity, and the possible detrimental effects of the decision, the
Court's holding should be read as narrowly as possible.
D. The Court's Test for Jurisdiction Should Be Changed in Light of
Yamaha To Reflect Better the Existence of Federal Interests.
Although the Court will most likely not overrule Yamaha anytime
soon, the tension created by the Court when it granted federal jurisdiction
but did not apply a uniform set of remedies should be addressed. There
are many ways to correct the problem, but, because the Court has already
determined explicitly that the state wrongful death remedies may
apply,179 it may be easier for the Court to reconfigure its jurisdiction test
better to represent when federal interests are involved so it does not have
to directly overrule Yamaha. The current jurisdictional test is overbroad
in that it has the potential to create more Yamaha-like conflicts in which
there may be no significant federal interests at stake, yet the parties are in
federal admiralty court. One sure sign that federal interests are not being
served is the application of state substantive law in federal court, because
state law should only be applied when there is no overriding federal
admiralty principle. 8° The current test for admiralty jurisdiction allows
for the application of state substantive law in certain situations. This
standard improperly measures the amount of federal interest involved in
resolving the tort, and, consequently, should be modified.
As discussed above, federal jurisdiction is warranted in admiralty
where there are significant federal interests in protecting maritime
commerce.'81 The Yamaha Court, however, held that these federal
interests were not enough to provide for a federal remedy.
To resolve this tension, the U.S. Supreme Court should change its
jurisdictional test so that it actually reflects the significance of the
appropriate federal interests. These interests involve providing a uniform
law to assure the free flow of maritime commerce whenever this flow
might be threatened. To reflect this concern, the Court should add a
factor to the test for maritime tort jurisdiction. In the context of a
wrongful death or personal injury action, if state substantive law appears
to apply, then federal jurisdiction should be inappropriate. If, factually,
there are insufficient interests to provide for unified maritime law, then
conceptually there is little necessity to grant admiralty jurisdiction. This
179. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 629 (1996).
180. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
181. See supra parts IV.A, .B.
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additional factor would limit admiralty courts to hearing cases that have
the actual potential to disrupt maritime commerce." 2 Additionally, it
would remove much of the uncertainty involved under the current
scheme of law because the Court has found that nearly all injuries
occurring on a boat at sea have the potential to disrupt maritime
commerce.'83 Thus, maritime operators would be better able to predict
the consequences of their conduct, which would lead to a better
allocation of their resources and a stronger maritime economy.8 4
Under such a test, maritime jurisdiction would have been appropriate
in Yamaha because the accident that caused Natalie Calhoun's death had
the potential to affect maritime commerce. Federal law should have then
applied, and the Calhouns should have been limited to recovering
pecuniary damages. Although the best result may be to have the Court
explicitly rule that a Moragne action precludes all stat.e actions, it is
unlikely to do so given its strong opinion in Yamaha. Therefore, this
subtle change in the jurisdictional test is necessary to allow lower courts
properly to strike the balance between federal and state law in a maritime
wrongful death context.
V. CONCLUSION
It is impossible for lower courts to undo the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision. Already, the lower courts are faithfully applying Yamaha as
precedent in their own opinions. 8 5 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
and the courts interpreting Yamaha can and should limit the holding in
Yamaha as severely as possible. Moragne was meant to create a uniform
system of recovery to continue the maritime tradition of encouraging
maritime commerce. State law, to the extent that it contradicts federal
law, should be pre-empted. Additionally, Yamaha creates a strange
182. The author recognizes the procedural difficulty of determining the substantive law before
determining the jurisdiction. Although a thorough response is impossible due to the limitations of
this Note, a possible starting point for this discussion would be the possibility of an in camera
hearing to determine whether state or federal law would likely apply. This hearing could eliminate
some of the judicial backtracking if a court in which a cause of action is filed subsequently
determines that maritime jurisdiction is inappropriate because state substantive vaw should apply.
183. See Yamaha, 116 S. Ct. at 623 ("Because this case involves a watercraft collision on
navigable waters, it falls within admiralty's domain.").
184. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81 F.3d 127, 128 (1lth Cir. 1996); Blome v.
Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 924 F. Supp. 805, 809-10 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Choat v. Kawasaki
Motor Corp., 675 So. 2d 879, 883-86 (Ala. 1996).
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anomaly where federal interests sufficient to provide federal jurisdiction
are not significant enough to confer a uniform system of remedies.
Even if Yamaha is limited severely and becomes a footnote in the
Court's jurisprudence, it serves to highlight a problem of admiralty
jurisdiction-that federal interests are no longer served by an
overexpanded test for federal jurisdiction. By finding that there can be
enough interest to allow for jurisdiction, but not enough to mandate a
federal remedy, the Court, in effect, also finds that its jurisdictional test
is too broad to measure federal interests. It is this author's hope that the
U.S. Supreme Court will realize the problematic nature of its decision
and limit its effect while utilizing it as a catalyst to form a jurisdictional
test that better reflects when federal interests are served.

